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Conspiracy Mentality Predicts Public
Opposition to Foreign Trade
Alexander Jedinger*
GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany
The proliferation of protectionist sentiments and policies has raised questions about
the psychological sources of trade openness among the public. The current research
investigated the effects of a previously neglected factor on attitudes toward international
trade: conspiracy mentality. Conspiracy mentality describes the generalized belief that
political and economic events are controlled by powerful malevolent forces acting
in secret. Using data from a cross-sectional survey of German adults (N = 391),
I hypothesized and found that conspiracy mentality is uniquely associated with the
perceived threat posed by foreign trade and opposition to international trade. These
findings suggest that individual differences in conspiracy mentality make an important
contribution to understanding the fears associated with economic globalization.
Keywords: conspiracy mentality, policy attitudes, foreign trade, protectionism, economic globalization
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been heated public debate about the political, social, and economic
consequences of international trade (Blendon et al., 2017). Although general support for foreign
trade remains high in most Western industrialized nations, free trade agreements such as the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have witnessed growing skepticism among
the public (Bluth, 2016; White, 2017; Steiner, 2018; Eliasson and Huet, 2019). In addition, many
countries adopted protectionist policies after the global financial crisis to shield their domestic
economy against foreign imports (Evenett and Fritz, 2019; World Trade Organization, 2019). This
development recently peaked under former U.S. President Donald Trump when he withdrew the
United States from key international trade agreements (e.g., the Trans-Pacific Partnership; TPP)
and enacted several increases in tariffs and other trade barriers that culminated in an ongoing
trade conflict with Europe and China (Chong and Li, 2019; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). Against
this background, understanding the psychological determinants of trade openness has become
an important task for scholars from various disciplines because protectionist attitudes have been
linked to rising levels of support for right- and left-wing populist candidates and parties that use
anti-globalization rhetoric to rally against immigrants and financial elites (Rodrik, 2018; van der
Waal and de Koster, 2018; van Bohemen et al., 2019).
Protectionist attitudes entail support for policies that restrict international trade to protect
the domestic economy from foreign competition (e.g., import tariffs or non-tariff trade barriers;
see Rodrik, 1995). Previous research has largely attributed protectionist sentiments to economic
insecurity among low-skilled individuals in export-oriented industries who feel threatened by
foreign competition (e.g., O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Kaltenthaler
et al., 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Notably, however, the material advantages and disadvantages
of global trade are of little importance in predicting attitudes toward foreign trade (e.g., Johnston,
2013; Rho and Tomz, 2017). Over and above material self-interest, recent work has argued that
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views on global trade are driven by generalized political attitudes,
including nationalism (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Rankin,
2001), ethnocentrism (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mansfield
et al., 2019), authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
(Johnston, 2013; Satherley and Sibley, 2016; Mutz and Kim, 2017;
Jedinger and Burger, 2020). In the present study, I contribute to
the growing research on the psychological basis of trade attitudes
by exploring the potential role of conspiracy mentality in
understanding the psychological differences between supporters
and opponents of free trade.
CONSPIRACY MENTALITY AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN TRADE
Conspiracy theories have long been a pervasive feature of societal
discourses, especially in times of social and economic crises (van
Prooijen and Douglas, 2017). Conspiracy theories are defined
as attempts to explain important societal events by the planned
actions of sinister and powerful forces, which act in the hidden
(van Prooijen, 2018; Douglas et al., 2019). For example, during
the Great Recession of 2008/2009, a popular conspiracy theory
proposed that the financial crisis was deliberately caused by Wall
Street bankers to expand the power of the American Federal
Reserve System (Oliver and Wood, 2014).
Empirical research consistently finds that beliefs in specific
kinds of conspiracy theories are strongly intercorrelated,
which suggests an underlying predisposition for conspiracy
explanations (e.g., Goertzel, 1994). This is true for conspiracy
theories that are relatively independent, fictitious, or even
contradictory (Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012; Brotherton
et al., 2013). Accordingly, several scholars have proposed the
existence of a conspiratorial mindset or conspiracy mentality.
Conspiracy mentality refers to a general propensity to view
societal events as the result of the secret plans of powerful
individuals and groups that pursue their own unlawful or
malicious goals (Moscovici, 1987; Brotherton et al., 2013; Imhoff
and Bruder, 2014).
During the last decade, scholars have begun to systematically
investigate the real-world consequences of conspiracy beliefs,
covering a wide range of issues from the environment to public
health and immigration, just to name a few (for an overview,
see Douglas et al., 2015). However, there has been a scarcity
of research that explored how endorsements of conspiracy
narratives are related to economic attitudes and behavior.
The idea that a clandestine group of powerful people controls
important economic and financial events is very popular, and a
malicious plot to rig the economy is part of many conspiracy
narratives (Uscinski, 2020). For instance, a common theme
within the so-called NewWorld Order conspiracy is that a global
elite who secretly controls international organizations such as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) is pursuing the worldwide
dismantling of trade barriers to establish an authoritarian world
government (Spark, 2000).
Economic phenomena such as globalization and international
trade provide fertile ground for conspiratorial thinking because
rapid economic changes elicit feelings of material insecurity
such as those associated with technological progress, offshoring,
and automation (van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017). Additionally,
economic issues are often complex and difficult for citizens
to comprehend, which in turn attracts people to simplistic
explanations to gain a sense of control (Baron and Kemp, 2004;
Leiser et al., 2017). Finally, public distrust in key actors of the
free market economy, such as major corporations and banks, is
widespread and fuels conspiratorial suspicion (Smallpage et al.,
2017; Gallup, 2020).
The uncertainties and complexity surrounding foreign trade
raise the possibility that conspiracy mentality may be an
important and previously overlooked explanatory factor for
protectionist attitudes. According to Imhoff and Bruder (2014),
conspiracy mentality is a belief system that entails a heightened
sensitivity to cues that signal power asymmetries in intergroup
relations. More specifically, the extent to which people subscribe
to a conspiracy mentality is associated with hostility toward
powerful groups that are held responsible for undesirable
developments in society. The concept of conspiracy mentality
can be situated within a larger theoretical framework of ideology
as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). Jost et al.
(2003) identified two core elements underlying ideological belief
systems: advocating vs. resisting social change and opposing vs.
accepting social inequality. These core elements are linked to
basic epistemic, existential and relational needs. In other words,
all individuals fundamentally strive for epistemic certainty,
physical security and positive feelings associated with belonging
to important social in-groups. The theory posits that those higher
in need of managing uncertainty and threats are more likely to
adapt conservative system-justifying belief systems because they
provide a functional match to their basic psychological needs.
Resistance to change is most often measured by right-wing
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996), which predicts negative
attitudes toward groups perceived as culturally deviant and
threatening to the norms and values of in-groups (Shaffer and
Duckitt, 2013). Acceptance of inequality is often related to
individual differences in social dominance orientation (Pratto
et al., 1994) that give rise to negative attitudes toward groups
of low socioeconomic status (Asbrock et al., 2010). In contrast,
conspiracy mentality has been conceived as a system-challenging
belief system because it entails an aversion toward those in power
(Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). However, recent work argued that
a conspiratorial worldview is a means to bolster the societal
status quo by attributing negative developments in society to
small groups of powerful but evil-minded conspirators rather
than to deficits of the social system as a whole (Douglas and
Sutton, 2018). Consistent with this reasoning, several studies
have indicated that threats to the legitimacy of the social system
actually lead to greater endorsements of conspiracy beliefs
(Federico et al., 2018; Jolley et al., 2018).
Conspiracy mentality also shares some conceptual similarities
with populist attitudes. Populism is defined as a generalized
attitude in which society is perceived as an antagonism between
the “pure people” and a corrupt political elite (Mudde, 2004).
The elite is assumed to act only for its material benefit and
against the interests of the people, while the people are assumed
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to have higher moral qualities. The skepticism toward power
elites and the Manichean view of the world are shared by
people high in conspiracy mentality and populist attitudes
(Castanho Silva et al., 2017). However, conspiracy beliefs aim
more at reducing epistemic uncertainty and the associated loss
of control by offering explanations for specific events that differ
from official accounts (Swami et al., 2010; Imhoff and Bruder,
2014). Furthermore, populist beliefs are primarily focused on
the role of the political establishment, whose actions are not
necessarily conspiratorial. Finally, an essential component of
populism is the alignment of political decision-making with
the “will of the people.” People with a pronounced conspiracy
mentality, on the other hand, see themselves as superior to
their fellow citizens because they feel “enlightened” and have
seen through the supposed conspiratorial machinations (Imhoff
and Lamberty, 2017). Thus, although conspiracy mentality and
populist attitudes have conceptual similarities, they indicate
different patterns of generalized attitudes.
Another line of inquiry focuses more on the consequences of
a conspiratorial mindset. Past research has shown that people
high in conspiracy mentality are more likely to express prejudice
toward powerful outgroups (e.g., managers and capitalists),
distrust the government, and tend to attribute less credibility
to experts (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014; Einstein and Glick, 2015;
Imhoff and Lamberty, 2018; Imhoff et al., 2018). Furthermore,
they are less likely to engage in conventional forms of political
participation (e.g., voting), which are deemed ineffective in
challenging existing political and economic power structures;
however, they are more prone to rely on alternative forms
of political participation, such as violent protests (Jolley and
Douglas, 2014; Uscinski et al., 2016; Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2020;
Imhoff et al., 2021).
More directly relevant for the current investigation, past
research suggests that people who endorse a conspiratorial
worldview are more likely to oppose policies promoted
by powerful agents (e.g., major corporations or national
governments) because they are supposed of serving the
sinister interests of clandestine elites (Imhoff et al., 2018;
Lamberty and Imhoff, 2018). For instance, Lamberty
and Imhoff (2018) demonstrated that individuals high
in conspiracy mentality evaluated a fictitious drug
more positively if its approval was advocated by a
low-power group (an interest group of patients) than
if the drug was supported by a high-power group (a
pharmaceutical consortium).
In the context of the current investigation, trade negotiations
often involve asymmetrical power relations between citizens,
on the one hand, and major corporations, international
financial institutions, and national authorities, on the
other hand. Consequently, the social, economic, and
cultural consequences of foreign trade will be perceived
as a threat to the well-being of citizens among those
higher in conspiracy mentality. Furthermore, any policy
that promotes the dismantling of trade restrictions will
be seen as a malicious plot to the detriment of the
interests of citizens and therefore opposed by those high in
this predisposition.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
Although previous research has examined the impact of
generalized political attitudes on protectionist sentiments, we
know relatively little about how a conspiratorial worldview
predicts aversion to economic openness. To address this gap, the
current study examines the extent to which conspiracy mentality
affects public opposition to free trade using data from a cross-
sectional survey among German Internet users. According to
the theoretical framework presented above, individuals high in
conspiracy mentality will perceive policies proposed by high-
power agents as suspicious. Free trade agreements and the
dismantling of regulatory barriers to trade have long been
promoted by the German government and influential business
associations, as the German export-oriented economy is highly
integrated into global trade (Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs Energy, 2020). Thus, I hypothesize that conspiracy
mentality will be positively associated with the endorsement
of protectionist attitudes (Hypothesis 1) and should increase
perceptions of the economic, social, and cultural threat posed by
international trade (Hypothesis 2).
I also control for several established covariates that are related
to trade preferences, such as resistance to change, acceptance of




The sample for the present study is a subsample (N = 391)
of a larger survey (N = 1, 000) on the consequences of
conspiracy beliefs among German citizens. A national quota
sample of adult German citizens was drawn from an opt-in online
panel maintained by a commercial survey agency (Respondi).
The quotas were set up to represent the German population
with internet access in terms of age, gender, education, and
region of residence. The survey was administered online between
March 9 and 16, 2020. The participants received a small
financial reward from the survey agency in exchange for
their participation. In total, N = 1,000 participants completed
the survey, and a randomly chosen subsample of N = 500
answered questions about their trade policy preferences. Of
these participants, 109 were excluded after listwise deletion of
missing data1. A sensitivity power analysis (α = 0.05, two-tailed)
indicated that a sample size of 391 allows the detection of a
relatively small effect (f 2 = 0.02) with 80% power. The age
of the remaining participants varied between 19 and 76 years
(M = 50.4, SD = 15.1), and about half of the participants were
1The percentage of missing values was relatively low (≤6.2%), except for self-
reported household income (10.2%) and attitudes toward trade agreements
(11.2%). However, Little’s (1988) test indicated that the data were missing
completely at random, χ2
(148)
= 160.83, p = 0.22. Thus, listwise deletion was
considered unproblematic. Nevertheless, missing values for household income
were imputed using predictive mean matching to avoid losing too many
observations. All variables from the analytical model were included in the
imputation model as well as employment status as auxiliary variable. As suggested
by the literature attitudes toward trade agreements as a dependent variable were
not imputed (Little, 1992).
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male (51.7%). Regarding their formal level of education, 20.7%
reported having a lower secondary qualification (after 9 years of
schooling) or no degree, 43.5% reported having an intermediary
secondary qualification (after 10 years of schooling), and 35.8%
reported having a higher secondary qualification (technical
college or University entrance qualification, after 11 or 12 years of
schooling). The medianmonthly household income category was
2,500 to <3,000 euros. The distribution of age and gender in the
sample largely corresponds to the German population, even after
respondents with missing data were excluded. Participants with a
lower education level were underrepresented, while participants
with amedium level of education were slightly overrepresented (a
detailed comparison can be found in Supplementary Table 2.1).
After providing informed consent, the participants completed
a questionnaire including measures of economic attitudes,
conspiracy beliefs, political attitudes, and a host of other items
unrelated to the present research. The exact wording of all
measures can be found in Supplementary Material, Section
1. Ethical approval was obtained from the local institutional
research and ethics committee.
Measures
Conspiracy Mentality
Conspiracy mentality was measured with a shortened five-item
version of the original Conspiracy Mentality Scale proposed
by Imhoff and Bruder (2014). All items were presented in
randomized order and scored on five-point scales ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The descriptive statistics
and corrected item-total correlations of the items are shown in
Table 1. The items were averaged to produce a composite score
(Cronbach’s α = 0.82; McDonald’s ω = 0.84).
Attitudes Toward International Trade
General opposition to international trade was measured by one
item “(What do you think about the growing trade relations
between Germany and other countries—do you think it is a
good thing, or a bad thing for Germany?”) adapted from Bluth
(2016). The participants were asked to rate their attitude toward
growing trade ties with other countries on a seven-point scale
(1 = very bad; 7 = very good). Furthermore, they were asked
to indicate their support for free trade agreements between the
European Union (EU) and other countries using a self-developed
item (“Currently, there is much discussion about the adoption of
free trade agreements. Do you favor or oppose that the European
Union (EU) enters free trade agreements with other countries?”).
Responses were given on a seven-point scale (1 = completely
support; 7= completely oppose).
Perceived Threats Posed by International Trade
To assess perceived threats associated with international trade,
the participants were asked to indicate whether growing global
trade had positive or negative consequences for Germany in
10 different areas using items adapted from Bluth (2016):
economic growth; employment and the labor market situation;
the consumer prices of goods and services; international
competitiveness; consumer protection standards (e.g., for
agricultural products); environmental standards; workers’ rights
and social standards; cultural life; state regulatory jurisdiction;
and cultural values and traditions. These areas were selected
because they constitute the main lines of public dissent on the
anticipated positive and negative consequences of international
trade. The participants responded to these items, which were
presented in a randomized order, on scales ranging from 1 (very
positive) to 7 (very negative).
To examine the factorial structure of the 10-item scale,
a principal axis factor analysis was conducted. The initial
eigenvalues and visual inspection of the scree plot suggested
that a single factor should be extracted. The first unrotated
factor (eigenvalue = 5.24) accounted for 94.3% of the total
variance, with factor loadings ranging between 0.66 and 0.76.
A parallel analysis, according to Horn (1965), suggests the
extraction of three factors. After oblique rotation (promax),
which takes into account that the factors are correlated,
the three-factorial solution could be clearly interpreted. The
first factor describes the perceived economic threats posed
by foreign trade (four items). The second factor refers
to the undermining of environmental, social, and product-
related standards (four items). The third factor refers to the
negative consequences of foreign trade for cultural values
(two items). All factors were strongly correlated (r ≥ 0.57).
The following results, however, do not differ substantively by
specific facets of trade threats (see Supplementary Materials,
Supplementary Table 3-1)2. Therefore, I use a composite scale of
perceived threat in the remaining analyses (Cronbach’s α = 0.91;
McDonald’s ω = 0.92).
Resistance to Change and Acceptance of Inequality
Generalized political attitudes indicating a tendency to derogate
out-groups and favor in-groups emerged as robust predictors
of trade attitudes, often rivaling the effects of more tangible
consequences of foreign trade (e.g., Mansfield and Mutz, 2009;
Johnston, 2013). According to Jost et al. (2003), generalized
political attitudes are based on individual differences in the
propensity to tolerate social changes and hierarchies. Resistance
to social change was captured by two items adapted from the
Moral Traditionalism Scale (Conover and Feldman, 1986). The
items include “The world is constantly changing, and we should
adapt our understanding of moral behavior to these changes”
and “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live
according to their own moral standards, even if they are very
different from our own” (both are reverse coded). Acceptance of
social inequality was measured with three items taken from the
Social Inequality Scale (Mayer et al., 2014) with statements such
as “The differences in rank between people are acceptable because
they essentially express what you did with the opportunities
you had.” Participants responded on five-point Likert scales (1
= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree), and an average score
was computed for resistance to change (Cronbach’s α = 0.45;
McDonald’s ω = 0.67) and acceptance of inequality (Cronbach’s
α = 0.68; McDonald’s ω = 0.68).
2An exception to this pattern is that conspiracy mentality is mainly associated with
economic and symbolic threat (see Supplementary Table 3-1).
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive item statistics for the conspiracy mentality scale.
Items M SD rit
1. Most people do not recognize the extent to which our lives are determined by conspiracies that
are concocted in secret.
2.77 1.32 0.72
2. There are secret organizations that have great influence on political decisions. 3.13 1.28 0.73
3. Politicians and other leaders are nothing but the puppets of powers operating in the
background.
3.30 1.21 0.70
4. I think that the various conspiracy theories circulating in the media are absolute nonsense.* 3.52 1.17 0.50
5. There is no good reason to distrust governments, intelligence agencies, or the media.* 2.47 1.14 0.41
The entries are the means, standard deviations, and corrected item-total correlations. The items marked with an asterisk * are reverse coded. Response scale: 1, strongly disagree, 2,
disagree, 3, neither agree nor disagree, 4, agree, and 5, strongly agree. N = min. 367.
Populism
Populism is a generalized attitude that divides society into
deceitful elites and the “true people” and demands that political
decision-making should be the expression of a homogeneous
“popular will” (Mudde, 2004). While populist attitudes are
essentially content-free because they refer to the inherent dualism
between political elites and ordinary people, the anti-elitist
component and distrust in political authorities could possibly
influence attitudes toward foreign trade. Therefore, populist
attitudes are included as a covariate in the following analyses.
Participant completed a six item populism scale (Akkerman et al.,
2014) that included statement such as “The political differences
between the elite and the people are larger than the differences
among the people” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
The scale exhibited very good reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.86;
McDonald’s ω = 0.87).
Labor Market Skills
According to classical trade theory, individuals with higher
levels of labor market skills and those working in export-
oriented sectors of employment are more supportive of trade
openness (Rodrik, 1995). Unfortunately, the survey does not
include questions about the respondents’ occupational industry.
However, I will use educational attainment, task autonomy, and
income as established indicators of individuals’ objective skill
level (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Blonigen, 2011; Blonigen and
McGrew, 2014). First, the participants were asked to report their
level of formal education and vocational qualifications, which
were combined to produce an overall measure of educational
attainment, as outlined byHoffmeyer-Zlotnik andWarner (2005)
(1= no professional qualification; 5= University degree). Second,
the participants indicated their occupational category (manual
laborer, clerk, civil servant, self-employed worker, or farmer),
followed by their level of professional activity (e.g., frontline
or managerial employee). The professional activity was then
categorized based on the degree of task autonomy (Hoffmeyer-
Zlotnik and Geis, 2003), with higher values indicating increasing
responsibility and leadership skills and lower task routineness,
resulting in a five-point scale ranging from 1 (low autonomy)
to 5 (high autonomy). Finally, the participants reported their
monthly household income using 12 categories that were recoded
to income quintiles (1= <1.500 euro; 5= 4,000 euro or more).
Demographics
The following demographic controls were included: age (in
years), gender (1 = male, 0 = female), and region (1 = East
Germany, 0=West Germany).
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among the
main study variables are displayed inTable 2. Consistent with the
hypotheses formulated above, conspiracy mentality is positively
correlated with opposition to free trade in general and free trade
agreements between the EU and other states. Furthermore, a
conspiratorial worldview is positively correlated with increased
levels of perceived threat posed by international trade. In turn,
perceived threat strongly correlates with opposition to trade
openness and trade agreements. Resistance to social change
was positively related to trade protectionism in general and
perceived trade threats but unrelated to attitudes toward trade
agreements. Conversely, the acceptance of social hierarchies was
negatively associated with the disapproval of trade negotiations
and beliefs about trade threats but unrelated to general
protectionism. As expected, the correlation analysis revealed
significant positive associations between populism and all three
indicators of protectionism. There was also a strong positive
correlation between populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality.
In line with previous research, individuals with higher levels
of educational attainment, task autonomy and income are less
likely to oppose trade openness, but only individuals who
score higher on task autonomy endorse the negotiation of free
trade agreements.
A series of hierarchical (OLS) regression analyses were
carried out to examine whether conspiracy mentality explains
any additional variance in trade perceptions and attitudes,
taking several covariates into account. Regressions diagnostics
indicated no violations of model assumptions. Although several
multivariate outliers were detected by means of Cook’s distance
(Cohen et al., 2003), excluding these cases does not substantially
change the results. In the first step, generalized political
attitudes, labor market skills and demographic characteristics
were included in the regression model. In the second step,
conspiracy mentality was added to the model. All continuous
variables were converted to range from 0 to 1 to facilitate the
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and correlations among the main study variables.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Conspiracy mentality 3.06 0.95
2. Opposition to free trade 2.90 1.18 0.29***
3. Opposition to free trade agreements 3.26 1.32 0.22*** 0.29***
4. Perceived trade threat 3.71 0.99 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.52***
5. Resistance to social change 2.69 0.83 0.09 0.18*** 0.09 0.26***
6. Acceptance of social inequality 2.61 0.87 −0.02 −0.04 −0.19*** −0.14** −0.14**
7. Populism 3.70 0.86 0.64*** 0.26*** 0.11* 0.25*** 0.10* −0.08
8. Educational attainment 3.57 0.97 −0.16** −0.16** −0.07 −0.05 −0.02 0.03 −0.16**
9. Task autonomy 3.03 0.93 −0.20*** −0.15** −0.15** −0.07 0.05 0.06 −0.18*** 0.45***
10. Household income 2.89 1.46 −0.22*** −0.12* −0.07 −0.01 −0.02 0.12* −0.19*** 0.26*** 0.24***
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; N = 391.
interpretation of unstandardized regression coefficients3. The
results are shown in Table 3.
In the first step, generalized political attitudes, labor market
skills, and demographic characteristics accounted for 14.4% of
the variance in perceived trade threats, 1R2 = 0.144, F(9, 381) =
7.10, p < 0.001, 14.7% of the variance in trade hostility, 1R2 =
0.147, F(9, 381) = 7.32, p < 0.001, and 9.6% of the variance in
opposition to trade agreements, 1R2 = 0.096, F(9, 381) = 4.48,
p < 0.001. The R2 change statistic between Step 1 and Step 2
indicated that an additional 2.1% of variance in perceived threat
was explained by adding conspiracy mentality to the model,
1R2 = 0.021, F(1, 380) = 9.65, p = 0.002. The incremental
increases in explained variance for disapproval of foreign trade
and trade agreements were 1.5% [1R2 = 0.015, F(1, 380) = 6.81,
p =0.009] and 2.6%, [1R2 = 0.026, F(1, 380) = 11.44, p <
0.001], respectively.
Mirroring the findings of the correlation analysis, conspiracy
mentality significantly predicted increased perceptions of threats
associated with the global exchange of goods and services,
heightened hostility toward free trade, and stronger opposition to
trade agreements. As can be seen from the regression coefficients
in Table 3, moving from the minimum to the maximum score for
conspiracy mentality increases the perceived threats from trade
and general trade hostility by 14 percentage points (b = 0.14, SE
= 0.04, β = 0.19, t = 3.11, p = 0.002, and b = 0.14, SE = 0.05, β
= 0.16, t = 2.61, p = 0.009, respectively). Regarding opposition
to trade agreements, changing from the lowest to the highest level
of conspiracy mentality leads to a shift of 20 percentage points of
the range of the dependent variable (b = 0.20, SE = 0.06, β =
0.22, t = 3.38, p= 0.001).
None of the other explanatory factors showed a comparable
consistent and substantial effect on anti-trade attitudes and
beliefs in the final step of the regression analysis. With regard to
the other predictors in the final model, only generalized political
attitudes had considerable effects on protectionism. As shown
in Table 3, there was again a significant positive relationship
3The conversion was done using the following formula: (observed–min)/(max–
min), with observed indicating the observed score for a given variable, andmin and
max denoting theminimum andmaximumpossible score on the scale, respectively
(see Cohen et al., 2003).
between resistance to change and the perceived threats of
trade relations as well as general animosity toward trade.
Acceptance of inequality was a significant negative predictor
of trade agreements between the EU and other countries.
After adjusting for other predictors in the model, populist
attitudes and individual differences in labor market skills did
not make a noteworthy contribution to predicting foreign
trade attitudes.
DISCUSSION
Opponents of foreign trade from both the left and the right
of the political spectrum often argue that global trade serves
the economic interests of powerful corporate capitalism, which
tries to control national authorities and to undermine the
liberal and social rights of ordinary people (Spark, 2000). In
the present study, I examined whether a generalized belief
that our society is controlled by the activities of conspiratorial
powers influences attitudes toward free trade. Although the
magnitude of effects are in the low to medium range, the results
show that conspiracy mentality predicts unique variance in
opposition to trade openness, even controlling for several drivers
of protectionist attitudes such as generalized political attitudes
and individuals’ labor market skills. Furthermore, individuals
who are more prone to a conspiratorial worldview feel more
threatened by the economic, political, and social consequences
of international trade. The results also show that resistance to
social change makes an important contribution to explaining
economic protectionism, which is in line with previous studies
that found strong negative effects of related constructs such
as authoritarianism on trade openness. By contrast, acceptance
of social inequality was negatively associated with animosity
toward trade agreements.While populist attitudes were positively
associated with protectionism in the bivariate analysis, they did
not contribute to the explanation of protectionist sentiments after
adjusting for general beliefs in conspiracies. This lends further
support to the discriminant validity of conspiracy mentality.
The results also confirm once again that material interests do
not play a major role in explaining trade attitudes compared to
intergroup attitudes.
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Opposition to free trade
agreements
Predictor B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta
Step 1: 1R2 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.096***
Resistance to social change 0.18*** 0.22 0.15** 0.16 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Acceptance of social inequality −0.07 −0.09 0.01 0.01 −0.17*** −0.17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Populism 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.12 −0.06 −0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Educational attainment −0.01 −0.02 −0.09* −0.11 −0.02 −0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Task autonomy −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.07 −0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Household income 0.04 0.09 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.02 −0.03 −0.09* −0.10 −0.10* −0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Male −0.03 −0.09 −0.05** −0.13 −0.05* −0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
East Germany 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Step 2: 1R2 0.021** 0.015** 0.026***
Conspiracy mentality 0.14** 0.19 0.14** 0.16 0.20*** 0.22
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.46***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Total R2 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.122***
The entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and standardized coefficients in the final step. All continuous variables ranged from 0 to 1;
N = 391.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
From a theoretical point of view, the results imply that
a new dimension of intergroup attitudes should be taken
into account in the psychological explanation of foreign
trade preferences. Previous studies suggest that people reject
free trade because they perceive trade relations as a zero-
sum game (ethnocentrism), associate the exchange of goods
with a negative influence of foreign ideas on their own
culture (authoritarianism), or are afraid of losing their own
status in competition with supposedly inferior nations (social
dominance orientation). However, thinking in conspiracy
categories makes not inferior but powerful groups responsible
for the negative effects of economic globalization. This
makes conspiracy theories particularly attractive to powerless
groups in society who see themselves on the economic
losing side.
The results also have practical implications for policies
addressing concerns about economic globalization. Thus far,
labor market and social policy measures have mainly been
designed to compensate the so-called “losers of globalization”
only materially by expanding welfare services (see Marcal, 2001;
Hays et al., 2005). However, the reported findings make it clear
that political countermeasures to economic nationalism should
also leverage economic education and debunking techniques
(van der Linden and Roozenbeek, 2021) to help people better
understand global economic processes and to avoid the pitfalls
of conspiratorial thinking.
The strengths of the present study are that the analyses are
based on a diverse sample and, unlike other studies, rely on
a relatively large number of items to measure foreign trade
perceptions and attitudes. In addition, the scale used to measure
conspiracy mentality is relatively abstract and is not, like other
scales, based on a selection of beliefs in specific conspiracy
theories (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013). Thus, the scale is not
contaminated with political and economic positions that one
might want to explain.
Naturally, however, the conclusions are also subject to some
limitations. The present sample is restricted to German citizens
with Internet access drawn from an opt-in online panel. While
Internet penetration in Germany is quite high, future studies
should strive to replicate the results using probability samples
that include the off-line population as well. Another limitation
is that the cross-sectional and observational design of the study
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does not allow for any statements on the causal relationship
between conspiracy mentality and protectionism. There is
evidence that experimental exposure to political conspiracy
theories increases distrust in governmental institutions (Einstein
and Glick, 2015; Kim and Cao, 2016), and it could be
worthwhile to manipulate the salience of conspiratorial thinking
to investigate the effects on economic attitudes and behavior.
The reliabilities of the scales measuring resistance to change
and acceptance of inequality were far from optimal, and
future studies should strive to assess the incremental validity
of conspiracy mentality using more established scales such
as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Likewise,
future research could profit from including measures of
nationalism to prove the robustness of the findings (e.g.,
Rankin, 2001). Moreover, it would be desirable to consider a
more extensive number of covariates for material interests to
account for the potentially confounding effects of the sector
of employment, automation, or offshorability (e.g., Owen and
Johnston, 2017).
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented here contributes to the growing research
on trade attitudes by showing that conspiracy mentality is an
important factor in forming trade policy preferences. Economic
globalization is associated not only with subjective fears of
material losses but also with irrational ideas about being
controlled by the invisible hand of dark forces. To be sure,
not all criticisms of globalization are based on conspiratorial
thinking, but people high in this trait are more likely to
link trade issues with the supposed actions of sinister groups
that pull the strings of international financial capitalism,
thus creating a breeding ground for populist reactions to
international trade.
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